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FOREWORD

In a March 2001 address to the Association of the United
States Army, General Eric Shinseki noted, “We are once
again an army between the wars, and once again, we are
challenged to adjust to break old paradigms. So we are
transforming to become strategically responsive and
remain dominant across the entire spectrum of military
operations.”
Army transformation has many dimensions with change
in technology, operational methods, and organizations. So
far, the focus of organizational transformation has been on
the redesign of tactical units such as the interim brigade
combat teams. But corps—the Army’s operational level
organizations—must also be transformed.
In his monograph, Dr. D. Robert Worley of the Potomac
Institute for Policy Studies provides a history of the
structure and function of Army corps and discusses ways
they might be redesigned to play an effective role in the 21st
century security environment. He concludes that the
different Army corps have such diverse functions that a “one
size fits all” approach is inappropriate. After considering a
number of options, he provides a blueprint for an array of
corps structures that would fulfill missions from
peacekeeping to major wars.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this
monograph as a contribution to the ongoing process of Army
transformation.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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W(H)ITHER CORPS?

INTRODUCTION
Army transformation should not be a “one size fits all”
process. Each of the Army’s surviving corps has a unique
origin. Relevance to present and future conflict
environments requires multiple destinations. Ultimately,
separate transformations are required to move from
distinct origins to diverse destinations.
Today’s U.S. Army corps have their roots in Napoleon’s
corps d’armée and the corps formed during the American
Civil War. Corps and divisions vanished after the Civil War.
Divisions were resurrected on the eve of U.S. entry to World
War I, but corps returned later as large tactical
headquarters during the preparation for World War II. The
Cold War, with its large standing Army, mature coalitions,
extensive network of modern infrastructure in what was
expected to be the primary theater of war, and known
enemy with known doctrine and known order of battle,
made corps the U.S. Army’s principal warfighting
command.
Today these conditions no longer hold. Given this,
should corps retain their preeminent role? Should corps
survive at all? The answer is unequivocally “yes.” But what
role should they play and what relationship should they
have with echelons above and below? There is no single
answer that applies across the Army. Whither corps?
In the face of small budgets and high operating tempo,
resistance to change is self-destructive. The Army must
remain relevant, or it will continue to lose in the budget
competition. But relevance to what? Some argue for
relevance to the many expected small wars at the expense of
the ability to fight “big” wars. Others argue for maintaining
a “big war” capability for unexpected but high stakes
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conflicts, at the risk of appearing irrelevant to the frequent
small wars. Still others argue that relevance is determined
by the ability to fight America’s “big wars” 20 years hence.
Regardless of where relevance for ground forces is found,
most agree that relevance will be determined in the context
of joint forces. In any case, organization will matter.
Refining the shape and function of corps will be a vital part
of the broader process of Army transformation.
THE COLD WAR CORPS
Each of the Army’s corps is tailored for a specific range of
missions. But, regardless of its mission-specific
composition, all corps have certain common characteristics.
For instance, a corps remains active for the duration of a
war, fights as part of a larger ground force, spans the
operational and tactical levels of war, and has a complex
and dynamic composition. Corps sustain campaigns and
operations. While a division fights and then withdraws to
reconstitute, a corps remains active until the campaign or
operation is completed and then moves to the next, possibly
taking on new combat power to continue the fight. The
continuous operations of corps and the concomitant need to
take on new divisions demand simple and standard
procedures between corps and lower echelon forces that
might come under its command.
One of the most significant assumptions embedded in
current organizational design is that corps—and, hence, the
lower echelon tactical commands—fight as part of a larger
ground force. As such, corps translate operational objectives
from a higher echelon command into tactical action for
execution by subordinate commands and elements. This
assumption is a dramatic symptom of the Army’s conception
of war—the Army fights America’s “big wars” and thus
should be organized for them.
As part of a larger ground force, from whom will corps
receive direction? General H. Norman Schwarzkopf chose to
retain strong direct connections to his corps, leaving his
2

army headquarters in more of a support than a command
role. But if it constitutes the largest ground element in a
theater of operations, a corps will take direction from a joint
task force and be responsible for all aspects of the ground
war. In a smaller-scale contingency requiring only a
division or brigade of ground forces, corps may provide
ground capabilities to a joint task force rather than forming
a subordinate command.
What are the implications for organizing, training, and
equipping lower-echelon ground forces when they are not
part of a larger ground force? The answer may not be
immediately apparent, but the ability to field a highly
integrated corps is less desirable than the ability to
construct a force from flexible building blocks. A corps’
composition is neither static nor standardized. Divisions
were and are designed to be complete for tactical combat.
Division organization has long been standardized under
tables of organization and equipment. Corps, in contrast,
have escaped such standardization. Corps have a
headquarters, major subordinate commands, and major
subordinate elements. Cold War doctrine retained the
language of dynamic composition, but capstone alignment
with subordinates created strong habitual relationships
leading to more complex bindings and procedures.
A corps’ major subordinate commands include divisions
(infantry, light infantry, armored, mechanized, airborne,
air assault), separate maneuver brigades of infantry or
armor, armored cavalry regiment, aviation brigade, and
corps artillery. Divisions constitute the majority of a corps’
combat power. Each Cold War corps acquired its own
armored cavalry regiment, the “eyes and ears of the corps
commander,” for forward reconnaissance in force. Corps
may take on new combat power prior to battle and may have
combat power added and taken away during battle. Because
of this, Haislip argued that corps must use simple standard
operating procedures (SOPs).1
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Each corps has an extensive complement of major
subordinate elements for support. In World War II, a corps
was both commanded by and supported by its superiornumbered army. During the Cold War, a corps was
subordinate to a multinational army and supported by a
U.S. Army component. As a result, each American corps
acquired a large, division-sized support command. Other
major subordinate elements include an intelligence
brigade, engineer brigade, air defense artillery brigade,
signal brigade, chemical brigade, military police brigade,
civil affairs brigade, psychological operations battalion,
finance group, and personnel group.
Strong habitual relationships developed between corps
headquarters, their major subordinate elements, and their
major subordinate commands. This was particularly true of
the heavy corps with assigned forces, but was also true of
the lighter corps with apportioned forces. A sound argument
can be made that habitual relationships lead to more
effective warfighting teams—if they fight the war they
planned on. However, habitual relationships produce
dependencies and limit the flexibility of a corps to perform
across a wider range of missions. SOPs become more
complicated as staffs of the many elements habitually work
in the same command structure. While written doctrine
retained the language of temporary relationships, strong
bonds developed through training and SOPs that were
developed for a very specific mission.
The question must be asked, when should the loss in
flexibility be sacrificed to the focused effectiveness offered
by the habitual relationship? Given the focused threat of the
Cold War, the answer was clearly to sacrifice flexibility for
immediate effectiveness. In the post-Cold War period, the
answer must be to favor flexibility to produce effectiveness
for a wider spectrum of scenarios. Haislip argued that the
dynamic composition of his World War II corps required
simple SOPs and simple interactions between corps and
division. His admonition again takes on added significance
in the current security environment.
4

In addition to the accretion of major subordinate
commands and elements, corps became the doctrinal center
of intelligence in the U.S. Army. The most sophisticated
national intelligence assets could not be fed to a
multinational (NATO) army headquarters, but they could
be fed to a U.S. corps. Planning and conducting deception
operations in consonance with the higher echelon’s
deception plan is another corps responsibility. Integrating
the capabilities of the other services is also doctrinally
centered in corps. A smaller-scale contingency based on a
division or smaller ground force requires parceling out corps
assets to form ad hoc headquarters or doing without those
functions provided by corps.
The demands of Cold War coalition warfare transformed
corps from an austere tactical headquarters into the U.S.
Army’s principal warfighting organization. In World War II,
armies were commonly provided by a single country, and
army groups were allied commands even if dominated by a
single country. During the Cold War, armies were allied
commands; corps and below were more likely to be single
country commands. The implications of the single versus
multinational nature of a command were many. The United
States provided logistical support for its own forces. It also
provided intelligence from national assets directly to U.S.
units, bypassing higher-echelon allied commands. Corps
was the highest echelon U.S. Army organization in the
NATO warfighting command structure.
Corps Specific Characteristics.
During the Cold War two heavy corps, V and VII Corps,
were forward deployed in Germany, while a third heavy
corps, III Corps, was prepared to deploy to Europe on short
notice. XVIII Airborne Corps, while it had a Cold War
mission, was largely focused on a variety of smaller
contingencies. I Corps returned from Korea to Washington
with responsibilities across the Pacific to include Korea. Of
the five corps, the three oriented on war in Europe
5

dominated doctrinal thinking and equipment requirements
in the Army.
V and VII Corps. U.S. Army V and VII Corps were
assembled under NATO’s Central Army Group (CENTAG)
under command of a U.S. Army general. Not really an army
group, CENTAG was a combined army including two U.S.
corps, a single German corps, and a separate German
brigade. V and VII Corps were based in Europe in defensive
postures against a possible threat from Eastern Europe.
Both benefited from, and depended on, superb German
transportation and communication infrastructure and
decades of intelligence preparation and familiarization with
the terrain.
V and VII Corps were shaped by decades of preparation
for a massive ground attack from waves of Warsaw Pact
forces. They were assigned a relatively small area of
responsibility along the inter-German border and the
mission to defend in place. They repeated a deliberate
planning cycle each 2 years, updating their war plan,
incrementally improving it, and absorbing improved
weapon systems as they were fielded. The strategic and the
operational levels of war were in the hands of planners,
while commanders focused on the tactical. Both corps
trained rigorously to execute the plan in the tactical time
frame. Should the war have come, there would have been no
time to mobilize so V and VII Corps maintained the highest
possible level of readiness. The force was heavy with
armored and mechanized infantry divisions forward
deployed. Habitual relations between corps and assigned
subordinates were strong.
III Corps. Also a product of deliberate planning, III
Mobile Corps at Fort Hood, Texas, was heavy and shared
the “big war” as its driving force. Unlike V and VII Corps, III
Corps planned for strategic movement. The corps
maintained a forward headquarters in Europe to
complement the command headquarters in Texas. Its
function was to maintain familiarity with the terrain and
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infrastructure, including the prepositioned equipment
maintained by German nationals, and to receive the force.
The forward headquarters collaborated with the Texas
headquarters in the biennial planning process.
When the United States proclaimed to NATO that it
would provide 10 divisions in 10 days, III Corps took the
promise seriously and began the preparation for this
monumental undertaking. Upon III Corps’ departure for
Europe, Army National Guard divisions would fall in on
Fort Hood and the equipment left behind. When ready, they,
too, would move forward to Europe. Deliberate planning
was central to III Corps’ mission. Habitual relationships
with assigned forces were strong.
After arriving in Europe and mating with prepositioned
equipment, III Corps would then conduct operational
movement across the continent to join either NATO’s
Northern or Central Army Group. Depending on conditions,
it would either counter attack or relieve another corps in the
defense, demanding more flexibility in its operational
planning than in V and VII Corps. III Corps’ capstone
training event, Roadrunner, as its name implies, oriented
on operational movement with headquarters and their
communications leapfrogging across the plains of Texas.
III Corps contributed its major subordinate commands
and elements to the Gulf War, but the Corps did not go. The
same is true of III Corps during Vietnam. In all likelihood,
its subordinate commands would have been parcelled out to
V and VII Corps as replacement units had it been called to
Europe. One has to wonder about the logic of building but
not using such a capable warfighting organization.
XVIII Corps. XVIII Airborne Corps and its subordinate
units also had a “big war” mission and participated in the
biennial deliberate planning process. One element of Cold
War deliberate planning envisioned a Soviet invasion of
Iran in the north through the Caucasus Mountains. The
U.S. response would be not through the European
Command but through the Central Command with its roots
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in the defunct Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force and in
XVIII Airborne Corps. The corps would deploy rapidly and
enter Iran in the south through the Zagros Mountains to
defend the oil fields. The ability to deploy rapidly and defend
was demonstrated in the early phases of Operation
DESERT SHIELD.
XVIII Airborne Corps was and is America’s contingency
corps. Based in North Carolina, it prepared for a broader
range of missions than did the heavy corps. In addition to
one heavy division and one light infantry division, it
includes the Army’s one of-a-kind airborne and air assault
divisions. Each of these four divisions has different
strategic, operational, and tactical mobility, as well as
different combat power characteristics, making it difficult
to mount an integrated corps offense. Despite this, XVIII
Corps demonstrated its offensive capability during
Operation DESERT STORM. A bolstered heavy VII Corps
transplanted from Europe was the main effort, however.
XVIII Airborne Corps stresses crisis action rather than
deliberate planning. Operation JUST CAUSE, the invasion
of Panama, typified its normal approach: crises action
planning, picking elements from across the force (including
elements beyond its habitual relationships), and rapid
deployment. XVIII Airborne Corps makes no assumption
about being part of a larger ground force, although it has
demonstrated that ability. In operations like JUST CAUSE,
it expects to be the highest echelon ground component in
theater and is prepared to take on operational
responsibilities in addition to its tactical responsibilities.
Given the changing threat, other corps may find themselves
with greater operational responsibilities in the future.
I Corps. I Corps in the Pacific Northwest was the lightest
of the five Cold War corps. It was light in the sense that it
lacked heavy divisions of armor and mechanized infantry. It
was also light in the sense that it was perennially under
resourced. It participated in deliberate planning in the
context of a Korean War scenario and was advertised as a
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Pacific contingency corps. For purposes of training, it acted
as the parent corps for three light divisions in the Pacific
Northwest, 6th ID(Light) in Alaska, 7th ID(Light) in
northern California, and 9th ID(Motorized) in Washington.
For purposes of war planning, I Corps was aligned with
heavy National Guard divisions. In the middle 1980s, I
Corps moved from Korea to Fort Lewis, Washington, home
of the 9th ID and its culture as an experimental test bed for
light forces.
Cold War Corps.
Planning strategic, operational, and tactical movement
produces a different corps than planning a tactical defense.
Perhaps this partially explains VII Corps’ performance in
the Gulf War. VII Corps was responsible for a much larger
area of operations in the Gulf than in Europe, and it was
responsible for a long operational march rather than
defense in place. Its communications were inadequate to the
larger area and movement requirements,2 and it could not
match the speed of the heavy division to its left.3 III Corps
had prepared extensively for strategic and operational
movement but was not used, just as it was not used during
Vietnam.
In their primary warfighting mission, III, V, and VII
Corps would conduct operations under command of a larger
multinational ground force: NATO’s Northern or Central
Army Group. This reality drove Army doctrine,
organizational design, equipment acquisition, and training.
The relationship with a higher echelon ground
headquarters also produced a negligible joint culture at the
corps echelon.
V and VII Corps were forward deployed, prepared for the
close fight, and were well integrated into a specific coalition
structure. III Corps planned and trained for strategic and
operational movement to enter the close fight as part of the
larger ground force. The missions of these three corps
dominated Army thinking. In this part of the Army—the
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“big war” army—the culture included a heavy reliance on
deliberate planning and heavy forces, and poor integration
with air forces. The XVIII Airborne Corps shares strategic
and operational movement with III Corps, but it was
prepared to be the largest ground component in theater,
contained a broad range of light and heavy forces, and relied
on crisis action planning. The airborne corps maintained
good multi-service relations with the Air Force for mobility,
but not for integrated air-ground combat. It has long been
hard to characterize I Corps and therefore hard to justify its
existence.
THE DIRECTION OF TRANSFORMATION
Transformation should produce greater relevance to
present and future needs. But the country’s needs are
complex, and we must ask relevance to what and when?
Transformation should preserve the good in the old and
discard what is not justified by present and future needs.
Finally, the destination of transformation need not be cut
from whole cloth; history offers several archetypes for
consideration. A corps must continually evolve to be
relevant.
Relevance to What War and When?
Within the services and the Department of Defense, the
concept of “transformation” has multiple, sometimes
incompatible meanings. One of the most important
determinants of the trajectory of transformation is the type
of future war that the U.S. military must be prepared to
fight. Identifying this is particularly difficult in the very
long term—2020 and beyond.4 Because of this, strategic
thinkers have considered at least four types of
transformation: (1) transformation from the garrison force
built for the “big war” of the 1980s to an expeditionary force
for small wars and contingencies; (2) transformation from
the industrial age force of the 1980s to an information age
force for 2020 and beyond—a dominant interpretation of the
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revolution in military affairs (RMA); (3) transformation
from the “big war” force for the 1980s to a “big war” force for
2020 and beyond; and, (4) transformation from
service-focused warfare to seamless joint warfare.
Baby and the Bathwater.
Transformation must preserve some characteristics, but
which ones? One way to answer the question is to examine
the premises that underlay the Cold War corps and to
compare them to the present reality and the uncertain
future that we must plan for.
One reality of the post-Cold War era is a reduction in
“above the line forces,” e.g., divisions and separate brigades.
Not only are there fewer of them, but an increasing
percentage of them are in the United States rather than
forward deployed. Forces once resident in Europe and
therefore assigned to the European Command are now
either disbanded or stationed in the United States.
Continental United States (CONUS)-based forces are the
scarce resources to be shared—assigned to Joint Forces
Command (JFCOM) in CONUS, apportioned through
multiple plans to multiple unified commands, and allocated
as crises emerge. Transformation must elevate the sharing
of scarce resources over the Cold War method of forward
deployed, assigned, and fenced forces.
The readiness model must also be challenged. During
the Cold War, the U.S. military focused on war in Europe
and thus maintained the highest level of readiness possible
across the force. Tiered or staged, readiness was often
discussed but went against the grain of the “big war” forces.5
Throughout the Cold War, however, naval forces and some
army units employed a rotational readiness model, with
only one-third of the force at the highest level of readiness at
any given time. Since the end of the Cold War, the Air Force
has boldly adopted the rotational readiness model that the
Army continues to resist. This has significant costs. Finding
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the right readiness model or models thus must be part of
transformation.
The “big war” culture within the Army should not be
dismissed lightly. The Marine Corps will quickly remind us
that it fights the country’s battles, but that only the Army
can fight America’s “big wars.” Transforming the Army to
fight small wars will kill this critical culture and capability.
The “big war” Army produces commanders and staffs
capable of prosecuting the strategic and operational levels
of war. Deliberate planning to mobilize, deploy, and sustain
a large force is the lynch pin. It does not take place in tactical
units. Skill at higher echelon command and staff must be
developed through career progression and training. All of
these factors suggest that transformation must preserve
the “big war” culture in some part of the force.
World War II offers evidence that the existence of a corps
and the existence of a corps headquarters are separate
issues. The inability to field a corps from head to toe does not
preclude the existence of a corps headquarters. Preserving
corps headquarters preserves career paths and enables
preservation of the “big war” culture. Having these
positions is necessary but not sufficient. Conscious effort
must be devoted to preparing commanders and staff for the
higher levels of war. It is customary to train corps
headquarters without troops in the field, relying instead on
computer simulations and a variety of scenarios
appropriate for the training audience. The same is true of
other higher-echelon headquarters, including Joint Task
Force (JTF) headquarters. Therefore, it is possible to
maintain the readiness of corps commands and staffs in the
absence of its subordinate units. The higher-echelon
commands can exist without assigned forces, but habitual
relations must be considered in transforming the force.
The transformed corps must be a combined arms
headquarters, deal with joint issues, preserve the “big war”
culture in the army, and be adept at the operational level of
war. It must be effective at small wars, “big wars,” and
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conceivable future wars. This is a demanding array of
requirements.
One alternative is to have no corps headquarters or corps
at all, as was the case between the Civil War and World War
I. In the case of major war, this would force the Army to
create a higher-echelon combined arms headquarters at the
last minute. All evidence suggests this is a formula for
disaster.6 Moreover, commanders and staffs would have no
opportunity to develop the skills needed at corps level and
thus would effectively destroy the “big war” culture in the
U.S. Army.
Another option is to keep only a small corps
headquarters except during a major war. World War II
offers evidence that the existence of a corps and a corps
headquarters are separate issues. The inability to field a
corps from head to toe does not preclude the existence of a
corps headquarters. The relatively low cost of small corps
headquarters allows more of them to be maintained.
Preserving corps headquarters preserves career paths,
allows staff and commanders the opportunity to develop
appropriate skills, and enables preservation of the “big war”
culture. It is customary to train corps as a headquarters
without troops. Therefore, it is possible to maintain the
readiness of corps commands and staffs in the absence of its
subordinate units.
The corps forward headquarters offers another model. It
would consist of a modest headquarters, forward deployed
with a small footprint. Small headquarters have two
primary duties: to be knowledgeable of the local political
and military situation and the military capabilities in the
region, and prepare to receive deploying forces and a larger
headquarters. The Army, through its corps forward, and the
Air Force, through many of its numbered air forces, have
long employed this model. Marines call the process of a
larger force falling in on top of a smaller force compositing.
But should the forward element be an Army corps
headquarters or a joint headquarters? The logic for a joint
13

headquarters forward is obvious and compelling. The corps
forward model maximizes the efficient use of scarce forces,
provides local expertise in theater under the command of a
regional Commander in Chief (CINC), provides a
political-military engagement, high-level presence, and
offers training opportunities and career paths for higherechelon commanders and staffs.
The Fleet Marine Force (FMF) is another model. It is
based on a garrison construct with ground combat forces
(division), air forces (air wing), and service support forces
(force service support group), along with a handful of
standing air-ground task force headquarters. The Marine
division maintains its subordinate units at various states of
readiness—rotational readiness—and continuously
provides infantry battalions to a small Marine Air-Ground
Task Force (MAGTF) for deployment at sea. The air wing
and force service support group function similarly as
providers to MAGTFs. In garrison, the FMF’s division,
wing, and support group units maintain separate
organizations for efficiency. The MAGTF is designed for
combined arms effectiveness and flexibility in
expeditionary operations.
The Cold War-era corps with large headquarters,
support elements, and assigned forces is another option. Its
high cost and the few forces available for such an
organization would limit the number that could be created,
perhaps to just a single one. This would offer only a few
training opportunities and career paths, while threatening
the capability to prosecute a “big war.” In that sense, it is the
worst of both worlds. While a major theater war may not be
imminent, such a conflict would post a serious danger, thus
retaining the ability to prosecute one seems prudent.
Having to form an ad hoc headquarters would not do this.
Destinations for Transformation: Whither Corps?
The Army cannot fight alone. It cannot get to a crisis
without the Navy or the Air Force, nor can it sustain itself in
14

theater without support from its sister services. Its abilities
for forcible entry and deep strike are modest. It cannot
survive in the field against an enemy with competent
tactical air power. Solutions must be joint; they must be in
the context of ground forces’ relationship to the employing
joint force.
The history of the Army has followed a progression of
combined arms warfare down to successively lower echelons
and smaller formations; 7 the same pattern is being
repeating with joint warfare. Joint warfare is combined
arms warfare compounded by a clash of theories and
bureaucratic obstinence. The JTF is the next step in
pushing jointness down. In the last decade, the JTF has
become the nation’s instrument of choice for command and
control of military operations at the operational level of war.
In the coming decade, a wide array of information age
systems for command and control nominally are being
developed for the JTF. Yet JTFs are typically created in
response to an emerging contingency or crisis, seemingly
inviting “first battle” problems.8
In transforming corps, the first objective is to improve
the nation’s ability to respond to crises by staffing and
training an organization that can effectively and efficiently
bring to bear the full range of capabilities provided by all the
uniformed services—command and control of combined
arms. The second objective is to improve effectiveness by
equipping an organization capable of exploiting the
dramatic advances in information technology and the
precision weapon systems they enable. This argues that
national intelligence assets be piped to a JTF headquarters,
not to a corps headquarters. It also argues that the JTF,
rather than the services, be the proponent for command and
control systems. Furthermore, the strategic and operational
levels of war are not single service environments, but the
domain of the joint force commander. The JTF is responsible
for the operational level of war, and corps translates
operational into tactical; therefore, transforming corps
must be discussed in the context of the JTF. Transformation
15

of today’s corps can lead to five forms: ad hoc JTFs; JTFs
forward; expeditionary JTFs; strategic JTFs; and,
experimental JTFs. These are not mutually exclusive, and
each form has strengths and weaknesses.
Ad Hoc JTFs. Like the Cold War corps, JTFs are
designed for a specific mission or range of missions. Unlike
Cold War corps, a JTF usually doesn’t exist until a crisis
demands it. Services believe that they can’t form a
single-service combined arms headquarters at the last
minute but, for some reason, the U.S. military seems to
believe that joint force headquarters can. The current
practice is to predesignate unified command component
commanders as potential JTF commanders. However, with
the exception of a brief period of training, the commander is
firmly ensconced in a single service job with a single service
staff.9 When a JTF is formed, its staff is built ad hoc.10 A
typical training event brings together a joint staff for a
weeklong, 24-hour per day, real-time, plan execution
exercise. When the exercise is over, the staff disbands.
JTFs Forward. In addition to service resistance to
standing JTFs,11 the CINCs of the unified commands resist
JTFs from outside their theater, i.e., from JFCOM. Regional
CINCs will accept the JFCOM role as provider of service
forces, but not as provider of joint force commanders.
Therefore, it is important to establish multiple standing
JTF headquarters in the unified commands along the corps
forward model. These must be capable of receiving
MAGTFs, air expeditionary forces (AEFs), or joint
air-ground task forces (JAGTFs) from CONUS. The JTF
forward headquarters may have staffs dominated by
planners, logisticians, and special operations forces.
Training would focus on the operational and regional
political levels and would provide career paths for higher
echelon commands and staffs. JTFs forward would plan and
train for compositing. They would not have assigned forces
but should build strong relationships with rotating forces.
They must be prepared to conduct operations with whatever
forces are allocated for a crisis. Strong habitual
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relationships must be built within the JTF forward, and
between it and its parent unified command. The JTFs
forward—commander and staff—must be distinct from
unified command service components.
VII Corps was disestablished after the Gulf War, and
much of its equipment was left behind in the area,
prepositioned for future contingencies. A resurrected VII
Corps is a candidate to be a forward headquarters in the
Persian Gulf region either as a JTF forward or as the land
component of a JTF forward. V Corps remains the major
ground force presence in the U.S. European Command
(EUCOM). Since the end of the Cold War, EUCOM has
increasingly been responding to crises on the periphery of
its area of operations and in sub-Saharan Africa. It remains
composed of forward deployed heavy forces not optimized
for such missions, requiring resort to naval expeditionary
forces, special operations forces, and CONUS-based light
forces. Heavy armor may be useful in the Balkans or in
Sierra Leone, but armored divisions are not. The
requirement is for military police, civil affairs, all forms of
service support, and, in some cases, for infantry supported
by armor. The composition of the infantry division is more
appropriate to these missions and capable of forming a
wider range of combinations.
To say that V Corps with heavy divisions is no longer
appropriate to the CINC’s needs is not to say that there
should not be a corps or Army presence in Europe. EUCOM
was a creature of the Cold War, well integrated into the
NATO command structure. In contrast, during the same
period the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) was
almost exclusively political in nature, with only a brigade of
light forces to protect the canal. Which model best meets the
needs of U.S. relationships with countries in Europe?
Perhaps there remains a role for one or more corps forward
headquarters with a role similar to III Corps Forward.
Other forward-deployed JTFs are possible. A boundary
shift removing sub-Saharan Africa from EUCOM and the
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“big war” army purview might also be appropriate. A
separate JTF forward under U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) oriented on small wars and expeditionary
operations with apportioned forces from XVIII Corps is
more appropriate for operations in sub-Saharan Africa.12 A
maritime JTF in Korea is another candidate for a JTF
forward. If trends continue, Oceania may warrant a JTF
forward as well.
Expeditionary JTFs. The recent spate of smaller-scale
contingencies did not see corps or divisions fighting as part
of a larger ground force. Instead, a mix of smaller units
functioned as the JTF’s ground component. To be relevant to
the expected small wars of coming decades, ground forces
must function as part of an expeditionary JTF.
The transformation from the “big war” to the “small
wars” force would be most difficult and destructive if applied
to III Corps. III Corps represents the heart of the Army’s
ability to project heavy combat power half way around the
world, to conduct sustained land combat operations, and to
close with and destroy the enemy. To transform III Corps to
an expeditionary force would represent a significant loss to
the country. An important deterrent would be lost, as would
a potent option for the national command authorities. Such
a transformation is against III Corps’ deliberate planning,
heavy forces, and “big war” culture.
XVIII Corps, on the other hand, embraces a contingency
culture and holds light forces in high esteem. The
assumption that divisions fight as part of a corps and that
corps fight as part of a larger ground force permeates the
organization, doctrine, and training in the “big war” Army.
Nowhere are those assumptions less applicable than in
XVIII Airborne Corps. It faces enduring problems acquiring
the level of close air support and battlefield air interdiction
that major war demands. It has not integrated well with
armored and mechanized forces. Nowhere is it more
important to match the high strategic mobility of light
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ground forces and air forces to produce a rapidly deployable
air-land team with dominant combat power.
Much real change since the end of the Cold War has been
focused on the division. There are fewer of them, and each is
lighter only because they are smaller. There are no new
division types, nor have any old division types been retired.
There has been little change with respect to divisions across
the active and reserve components. Change at the division
level is about size, not shape. The degree of specialization at
the division level was appropriate for the Cold War army of
28 divisions but not for today’s army of 16 divisions. The
appropriateness of the division structure at III Corps is an
entirely different issue than the appropriateness of the
division structure at XVIII Corps.
Nowhere in the Army is the inappropriateness of the
division structure more obvious than in XVIII Airborne
Corps. Does the country need the forcible entry and high
strategic mobility provided by airborne forces? Does the
country need the ability to move ground forces rapidly
around a theater of operations as provided by the
helicopter-borne air assault forces? Most certainly, on both
counts. Should those capabilities be localized into single,
division-sized structures? Probably not. Should those
capabilities instead be resident in other ground forces?
Marines excel at forming Marine Expeditionary Units
(MEUs) built around an infantry battalion but can also form
Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) and Marine
Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) at the regiment and division
level, respectively. The larger MAGTFs are problematic due
to the relatively small size of the Marine Corps. It is
reasonable, then, to expect that the Army-Air Force joint
air-ground task force should focus on forming at brigade,
division, and corps levels.
To be relevant to the many small wars expected in the
next two decades, the assets of XVIII Airborne Corps and
those expected under a true numbered air force should be
combined, then their former headquarters gutted as
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warfighting commands. The freed assets should be
recombined into an organization capable of commanding
joint air-ground task forces, principally deployed by air. The
new organization should be created in accordance to the
FMF model, including several standing JTF headquarters
analogous to the standing MEB and MEF headquarters.
Perhaps the resources of one or more MEF headquarters
could be freed as a result.
Using the FMF model, the army corps would primarily
be a provider of brigades and divisions to a joint task force.
The Air Force would provide its pieces as well, perhaps in
the form of composite wings. America’s contingency JTF
could provide complex combined arms teams of airborne, air
assault, light infantry, mechanized infantry, armor,
artillery, engineers, tactical aircraft, and airlift. These JTFs
should provide larger air-ground task forces than existing
Navy-Marine Corps teams. They would be prepared to
composite onto a JTF forward or onto an amphibious-ready
group with MEU, and be prepared to be composited on by a
larger JTF. This option, of course, has serious force sizing
implications. It would be difficult to do with the current
force structure, much less a smaller one.
Training would include habitual relationships with
several JTFs forward for compositing and planning. Unlike
the habitual relations between headquarters and major
subordinate commands and elements, habitual relations
should be within headquarters and between headquarters
and headquarters forward. Rotational readiness is
appropriate for expeditionary JTFs. These garrison
organizations would be powerful proponents for joint
command, control, communications and computers
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR),
strategic and theater lift, close air support, and battlefield
air interdiction. They would be the recipients and
benefactors of training as opposed to the current method.
They would retain a crisis action planning culture rather
than a deliberate planning culture. They would be capable
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of forcible entry. Standing command teams would be
organized, trained, and equipped prior to crisis emergence.
Strategic JTF. III Corps is the keeper of the heavy, “big
war” culture born of World War II, criticized as irrelevant
during Korea and Vietnam, risen again to ascendancy later
in the Cold War, and vindicated in the Gulf War. To be
relevant as a deterrent and blunt instrument for the
unexpected major theater war, III Corps, and its “big war”
culture, must be preserved in the context of a JTF.
Maintaining III Corps does not necessarily mean
maintaining its internal structures, and it does not mean it
should evade transformation. Perhaps III Corps is where
transformation should take place without waiting for new
systems. This could take the shape of the organizational and
cultural changes described in Douglas Macgregor’s
Breaking the Phalanx, rather than a technologically-driven
transformation.13 While greater strategic mobility would be
an objective, combat power and mobility would remain the
primary objective.
To improve strategic mobility without sacrificing combat
power and in-theater mobility, III Corps should become a
joint air-ground task force on a theater wide scale, and not
in the Cold War model of separate air and ground forces. It
must be organized, trained, and equipped to conduct tightly
coupled air-ground operations as practiced by Generals
George Patton and Pete Quesada in World War II Europe
and as practiced by the Marine Corps in small units.14 The
strategic JTF must be capable of fighting in coalition or on
its own. Coalition partners may provide their own JTFs, or
coalition ground forces and air forces may be combined into
large ground and large air forces subordinate to coalition
command. In the latter case, the transformed corps must be
prepared to integrate with a larger ground force, a combined
army, as in the Cold War.
Resources devoted to improving strategic mobility would
be for naught if the force were not trained and ready for
deployment. This JTF, standing from head to toe, should
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employ a total force readiness model rather than a
rotational readiness model. The geo-strategic environment
and the availability of strategic lift assets should determine
the level of readiness maintained. It would provide career
paths, training, and experience to continue building “big
war” commanders and staffs. More than one of these JTF
headquarters could be maintained without requiring the
underlying forces. Habitual relations between JTF
headquarters and assigned forces may be the preferred
method of operations in garrison.
Perhaps another corps headquarters on this model could
be established as a strategic reserve. In the short term, the
strategic reserve corps would be more of a training harness,
functioning to provide replacement units to the deployed
strategic corps. Given longer lead times and the need, lower
echelon forces mobilized from the Reserve component may
be allocated to the strategic reserve corps for later
deployment as a whole. This strategic reserve corps
headquarters would complete the same training program as
the standing strategic corps. A tiered readiness model
would be appropriate for the strategic reserve corps and
strategic reserve JTF.
Experimental JTF. If responsibility for transformation
is assigned to a part of the force with current readiness
requirements, it will always be a back burner issue.
Incrementalism will be the rule. Given the recent
operational tempo within the U.S. military, transformation
will continue to be modest indeed. With XVIII Corps’
contingency responsibilities, transformation would always
be secondary to current readiness. If III Corps were given
the long-term transformation mission, its culture would
interpret the mission as, “Given a heavy corps, how can
information technology be applied productively?” A new
organization needs to be created that will ask the question,
“Given all this information technology, what force would I
build?”15
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The requirement for jointness is even stronger within
the context of long-term transformation. Joint
experimentation must seek solutions independent of
current service roles and missions. A separate joint
command, perhaps a JTF, must be created as the proponent
for this transformation. To assure that experimentation is
truly joint rather than multiservice, the JTF should not
have separate service components, as is the custom, but a
separate funding stream and authority. The joint force
commander must be a true commander, not a coordinator of
service components.
Perhaps the obvious home for this function is JFCOM.
However, Army history offers an important lesson. When
the Army undertook the task of rebuilding itself after
Vietnam, it consciously decided that readiness for today and
readiness for the future were too different to be put under a
single command. Army reforms in 1973 created the Forces
Command (FORSCOM) and the Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC). Readiness for today—unit training
and readiness—was assigned to FORSCOM. Responsibility
for individual training, doctrine development, and combat
developments was assigned to TRADOC, which was created
above, and against the resistance of, the powerful branch
schools. A long succession of the Army’s brightest flowed
through TRADOC. Most will ascribe credit for rebuilding
the Army to the success of TRADOC.16 If a single service
couldn’t transform itself in the face of current readiness
requirements under a single command, why would we
expect joint transformation to be accomplished under a
single command? The functions of today’s JFCOM need to
be split into a JFCOM with current readiness
responsibilities and a Joint TRADOC with future readiness
responsibilities.
Given the difficulty justifying I Corps’ existence, its
resources should be applied elsewhere. The resources of I
Corps should be given over to the experimental JTF along
with similarly freed resources from the other services.
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CONCLUSION
Changing the entire army structure may not be called
for, but examination of the entire structure is. Such
challenges should be made throughout the force. The
structure of all four services should be examined
individually and, more importantly, collectively. Force
structure should be rationalized and justified in a top down
process beginning with the Joint Strategic Planning
process. Having the best air, land, and sea forces is not the
objective—providing the CINC, and increasingly the JTF
commander, with the best combined arms team is.
A great deal of the debate over transformation focuses on
equipment, either as an end in itself or as a step prerequisite
to transformation. Equipment modernization, a worthy
topic, consumes resources including time, and competes
with or defers true transformation. Some transformations
vary the equipment set while holding the command
hierarchy constant, for example, attempts to digitize a
heavy corps or to equip divisions with wheeled rather than
tracked armored vehicles. Transformation is a much
broader issue than modernization. In contrast, Macgregor
has challenged the division and brigade echelons—their
organization and doctrine—while initially holding the
equipment set constant.17 This allows transformation to
begin immediately without being held hostage to the
lengthy acquisition and fielding process.
The country demands more of its Army than can be
accomplished in a single transformation. Nonetheless, our
military forces must continually evolve to remain relevant
to the present and to the future. But there are many types of
relevance and separate transformations must be applied to
accomplish each.
• Relevance to the expected and frequent military
operations in support of national interests through light
forces designed for small wars.
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• Relevance to the unexpected wars in support of vital
national interests through heavy deployable forces.
• Relevance to the uncertain future through
experimentation.
The joint task force is the crux of the matter. By ignoring
it—e.g., corps headquarters masquerading as JTF
headquarters—the services have preserved their most
prestigious three-star commands, the status quo, and
service prerogatives. Single-service structures defy joint
structures, and weak joint organizations perpetuate
separate service warfare. The three-star headquarters of all
the services should be challenged and, when appropriate, be
dismantled; the freed resources combined to form true JTF
headquarters. Standing JTFs and standing JTF
headquarters would provide a focal point for acquisition of
command and control information systems. Connection to
national and other scarce intelligence and communications
assets must reside in the JTF, not in service headquarters.
Standing JTF headquarters would also enable
experimentation with new methods of warfare as portended
by advocates of an RMA and by the transition from the
industrial to the information age. Expectations are high for
increased warfighting effectiveness enabled by information
technology and precision weapons. Realistic
experimentation with these systems and new methods can
both expedite and hone emerging capabilities as well as
protect us from an over-reliance on unproven concepts.
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